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Overview of Enable-S3 project work involving
Event-B
Dr C. F. Snook
University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
cfs@soton.ac.uk
1 Outline of Enable-S3 Project
Enable-S3 is a EU funded Horizon 2020 project. The overall objective of the
project is to”establish cost-efficient cross-domain virtual and semi-virtual V&V
platforms and methods for Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems (ACPS) ”. A
major part of the project is focused on improving simulation for testing pur-
poses. This involves modelling in order to simulate a good coverage of scenarios
in an efficient manner. University of Southampton (SOTON) differs in that it
aims to use Event-B based modelling to provide correct by construction systems.
The models are primarily used to detect problems early in the requirements by
theorem proving of abstract concepts rather than by testing artefacts using sce-
nario simulation. However, the Event-B models may also be useful in a scenario
testing context as outlined later. in this sense, the Event-B models contribute
a complimentary alternative approach to V&V of ACPS as well as integrating
with the main philosophy of the Enable-S3 project.
2 Event-B in the Enable-S3 Project
The Enable-S3 project is industry driven and involves many industrial domains.
SOTON is participating in three of these domains: Maritime, Avionics and Rail.
2.1 Maritime
In the maritime domain, a company called NAVTOR are developing a shore-
based bridge for autonomous control of merchant shipping. SOTON is contribut-
ing to this use case by analysing the security of the communications link using
a combination of Systems Theorietic Process Analysis (STPA) and Event-B.
2.2 Avionics
In the avionics domain, a company called AIRBUS are developing a system
for controlling aircraft servicing equipment by the serviced aircraft. SOTON is
contributing to this use case by analysing the security of the Touch And Go
Authentication (TAGA) authentication process using a combination of iUML-B
and Event-B
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2.3 Rail
In the railway domain, a company called Thales are developing railway control
products. SOTON is contributing to this use case by analysing the safety of
the railway control products using a combination of iUML-B and Event-B. To
support this use case, SOTON is also making improvements to the Event-B
methodology and tools. Improvements to the modelling tools are outlined in
section 3. One such improvement to the Event-B methodology is described in
section 4.
3 Improvements to Event-B modelling tools
3.1 Improvements to iUML-B
Several features have been added to the iUML-B Class diagram tools. These
include:
– subtype groups - groups of subtypes csan be specified to be disjoint or par-
titions,
– initialisation - improved features for initialising attributes and associations,
– enumerations - enumerated sets can be specified to be the instances of classes,
– placement of constraints - constraints can be specified to be axioms in a
context, even if the diagram is in a machine.
3.2 Text editor
A text-based serialisation of Event-B has been developed and a text-based editor
is provided. This allows true text-based model comparison e.g. in a repository.
3.3 Component-based model structuring (inclusion)
A model structuring mechanism has been developed. This allows Event-B mod-
els to be structured in a hierarchical component fashion by including re-usable
component machines in parent machines. Multiple instances of a machine may
be included.
4 Behaviour Driven Formal Model Development
Formal systems modelling offers a rigorous system-level analysis resulting in a
precise and reliable specification. However, some issues remain: Modellers need
to understand the requirements in order to formulate the models, formal verifi-
cation may focus on safety properties rather than temporal behaviour, domain
experts need to validate the final models to ensure they fit the needs of stake-
holders. To address these issues we have introduced a method that that applies
the principles of Behaviour-Driven Development (BDD) to formal systems mod-
elling and validation. We propose a process (Figure 1) where manually authored
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scenarios are used initially to support the requirements and help the modeller.
The same scenarios are used to verify behavioural properties of the model. The
model is then mutated to automatically generate scenarios that have a more
complete coverage than the manual ones. These automatically generated scenar-
ios are used to animate the model in a final acceptance stage. For this acceptance
stage, it is important that a domain expert decides whether or not the behaviour
is useful.
Fig. 1. A behaviour driven process for formal model development
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Developing distributed resource allocation
protocol with Event-B
Paulius Stankaitis1, Alexei Iliasov1, Alexander Romanovsky1, Yamine
Aı¨t-Ameur2, Tsutomu Kobayashi3, Fuyuki Ishikawa3
1 Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom
2 INPT-ENSEEIHT, 2 Rue Charles Camichel, Toulouse, France
3 National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan
Corresponding author: p.stankaitis@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. In this presentation we present the development of the dis-
tributed resource allocation protocol in Event-B. Ensuring deadlock free-
dom of the protocol is the main challenge of this work and by using
proof and stochastic simulation techniques we demonstrate the contin-
ues progress of the protocol.
Keyword: Formal Verification · Stepwise Development · Event-B
1 Introduction
Developing distributed systems is an intricate process which requires rigorous
methods due concurrent nature of the distributed system. Formal methods - a
mathematical model driven methods provide a systematic approach for develop-
ing complex systems. They offer an approach to specify systems precisely via a
mathematically defined syntax and semantics as well as formally validate them
by using semi-automatic or automatic techniques. In particular formal notations
such as Event-B [1] are thought to be well suited for development and verifica-
tion of various protocols. The stepwise and proof driven development provided
by such methods is attractive to developers and can significantly reduce the
modelling and verification effort.
In this research we attempted to develop and verify a new distributed proto-
col for resource allocation. By only considering an environment where message
exchanges are allowed between agents and resources, and messages are allowed
to arrive in any order (message delays) we identified a handful of scenarios how a
distributed system could deadlock. Throughout the research we modified the pro-
tocol numerous times as additional intricate deadlock scenarios were discovered
by inspecting undischarged proof-obligations or using ProB model checker [3].
The final protocol version was proved to be correct under some environment
assumptions with the Rodin [4] platform whereas system liveness property was
demonstrated using PRISM tool [2]. In the presentation we present our results on
modelling and verification of the distributed protocol. Furthermore, we discuss
potential modelling patterns for distributed systems and Event-B verification
challenges we endured while developing the protocol.
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Design of distributed systems from
choreographies specifications. A refinement based
approach
Yamine Aït-Ameur1, Sarah Benyagoub1, Meriem Ouderni1, and Atif
Mashkoor2
1 INPT-ENSEEIHT/ IRIT, University of Toulouse, France
2 Software Competence Center Hagenberg
{yamine, sarah.benyagoub, meriem.ouederni }@enseeiht.fr
atif.mashkoor@scch.at
Today’s interaction-based systems are more often built by reuse of existing
distributed peers which have to coordinate with each other to fulfil client and
environment requirements. Here, choreographies is a common formalism which
describes the coordination as a set of conversations, i.e. the sequences of messages
exchanged between the communicating peers. Checking choreography realisabil-
ity is mandatory to built the third-party application with no coordination error
(no deadlocks, missing messages, erroneous messaging order, etc.)
Our work proposes a stepwise development method allowing a designer to
build correct-by-construction distributed systems specified as choreographies
modelled with so called conversation protocols. The approach relies on a set
of correct-by-construction composition operators that preserve realisability. Ad-
ditionally, we consider the incremental repairability of CPs identified as non-
realisable using the set of defined composition operators that satisfy sufficient
conditions for realisability preservation. Reparation consists in identifying a set
of changes completing intermediate non-realisable CPs so as the resulting CP
becomes realisable. Our approach is validated through a successful application
to CPs borrowed from the literature.
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Multi-Layered Safety Architecture of
Autonomous Systems: Formalising Coordination
Perspective
Inna Vistbakka1, Elena Troubitsyna1,2, and Amin Majd1
1 A˚bo Akademi University, Turku, Finland
2 KTH, Sweden
{inna.vistbakka, amin.majd}@abo.fi, elenatro@kth.se
Abstract. A pressure to deploy autonomous systems in real-life is in-
creasing. Since exhaustive verification of safety of autonomous systems is
unfeasible, the emphasis should be put on safety optimisation and run-
time safety-monitoring techniques. In this paper, we propose a multi-
layered architecture of autonomous systems. We define the notions of
strategic, tactic and active safety – the complementary mechanisms for
achieving safety. We take a swarm of drones as an example and formally
define a multi-layered safety architecture and associated coordination
mechanisms and underlying communication model to implement the de-
fined complementary safety mechanisms. The derived coordination logic
and communication model is formalised in Event-B framework.
Keywords: Safety, autonomous systems, coordination, formal modelling,
Event-B, swarm of drones
1 Summary 
Autonomous systems are capable of delivering their services in a highly indepen-
dent way, i.e., without human supervision. Currently the autonomous systems,
such as self-driving cars, drones etc. are getting ready for real-life deployment.
Typically, autonomous systems rely on machine learning, e.g., to realise com-
puter vision, and hence, the system behaviour continuously evolves. This makes
the exhaustive pre-deployment verification of autonomous systems unfeasible.
Therefore, to achieve safety of autonomous systems, we should rely on a combi-
nation of pre-deployment and run-time safety-monitoring mechanisms.
In this paper, we propose and formalise a novel multi-layered architecture
to ensuring safety of autonomous systems. The main idea of our approach is to
guarantee safety of autonomous systems by combining “safety-maximising” mis-
sion planning – strategic safety, proactive run-time safety maintenance – tactical
safety and emergency response aiming at mitigating or removing hazard – ac-
tive safety. Each type of safety mechanisms is implemented at the corresponding
architectural layer.
While designing autonomous systems, typically we should trade off safety
with other system characteristics, such as performance, quality of service, etc.
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For instance, let us consider a swarm of drones. To accomplish the required mis-
sion, the drones should have a high probability of surviving throughout the entire
mission, i.e., they should not prematurely deplete their batteries. This requires
minimisation of energy consuming functions, e.g., travel distance, communica-
tion etc. However, such a minimisation might result in planning a mission that
has a high risk of drone collision. In this context, strategic safety can be imple-
mented by an optimisation algorithm that uses safety, i.e., the risk of collisions,
and the travel distance as the parameters of the optimisation. Strategic safety re-
lies on high performance optimisation algorithms and hence can be implemented
in cloud.
When the swarm starts to move, the drones can deviate from the predefined
routes due to unforseen environmental factors, e.g., wind, or internal problems,
e.g., transient hardware failures of drones. The positions of the drones should
be continuously monitored and their routes recalculated to maintain efficiency
and safe distance between the drones. Such activities are called tactical safety.
Tactical safety can be implemented at the edge.
Finally, an unexpected obstacle might appear in the flight zone of the swarm.
To avoid a collision, the active safety – an emergency stopping or safe maneu-
ver should be executed. The active safety requires fast response and should be
implemented locally, at the drone level.
Such a multi-layered distributed implementation of the safety mechanisms re-
quires a complex coordination scheme that cater to variety of situations: drone
and communication failures, changes in the external environment such as unex-
pected appearance of obstacles etc. To design the proposed multi-layered safety
architecture, we rely on formal modelling in Event-B [1].
Event-B is a state-based approach to correct-by-construction system devel-
opment. The main development technique – refinement – supports stepwise con-
struction and verification of complex specifications. We start the development by
creating a high-level abstract specification, which is incrementally augmented to
unfold the entire multi-layered architecture and verify correctness of the inter-
play between the safety mechanisms at different architectural levels. Abstraction,
refinement and proofs as well as automated tool support allow us to scale the
formal development to such complex problem.
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Embedding Formal Specifications as Libraries
into Applications
Philipp Ko¨rner  , Michael Leuschel
Institut fu¨r Informatik, Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf
Universita¨tsstr. 1, D-40225 Du¨sseldorf, Germany
p.koerner@uni-duesseldorf.de
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Abstract. In the past decades, the increase in memory and computa-
tional power gave rise to executable specifications and associated tech-
niques, e.g., model checking. Yet, executing a particular path fragment
in production usually requires code generation.
Here, we discuss another approach: Instead of generating code, we embed
a model checker into applications to directly execute formal models. In
particular, we use ProB 2.0, a Java API to the ProB animator and
model checker. We present this API as well as several projects that use
it to interact with a formal specification at run-time.
1 Introduction
Animators and model checkers are well-known tools that are used during devel-
opment of a formal model in order to ensure correctness. They require speci-
fications to be executable though. When considering executable specifications,
usually one has code generation in mind. In the case of B and Event-B, which
are high-level formalisms, code generators usually require refinement to an im-
plementation level which is both cumbersome and very low-level.
The idea presented here is as follows: model checkers for these formalisms,
e.g., ProB, can deal with high-level constructs via constraint solving techniques.
With a high-level API, one can execute state transitions (aka operations or
events) individually and access the successor state. This allows to abuse the
specification languages as a high-level programming language, and to ship for-
mal specifications as libraries. For this, we use the aforementioned specification
languages, B and Event-B, and the model checker ProB. To our knowledge,
this approach is unique and has not been used in combination with any other
formalism or animation tool.
In the following, we briefly introduce two high-level specification language,
B and Event-B, as well as ProB, an animator and model checker for these
languages. Afterwards, we present ProB 2.0, an API that allows us to interact
with ProB in Section 2. Following, we discuss several applications based on
ProB 2.0
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1.1 B, Event-B and ProB
Both B [2] and its successor, Event-B [1], are state-based specification languages
that allow for high levels of abstraction. They are based on first order logic and
set theory. Further, they make use of general substitution for state modifica-
tions, and of refinement calculus [3,4] to describe models at different levels of
abstraction [5].
The idea behind both formalisms is that, starting from an abstract state
machine, the model is iteratively refined to an implementation level that can
be used for code generation. Yet, this process is often cumbersome, requiring
proof linking the different refinement levels as well as elimination of high-level
constructs such as sets, quantifiers and non-determinism.
ProB [10] is an animator and model checker for both B and Event-B. Its core
is developed mainly in SICStus Prolog [7], with some parts being implemented
in C and Java, and makes use of co-routines and SICStus’ CLP(FD)library [6].
Besides B, ProB offers support for several other formalisms as well, including
TLA+ (via translation to B), Z, CSP and many more.
2 ProB 2.0
As ProB is written in Prolog, which admittedly is neither the most popular nor
the easiest to pick up language, it is hard for formal method experts to use any-
thing but the default animation and model checking capabilities. Thus, a main
design goal of ProB 2.0 was to offer access to the API of ProB via a scripting
language that allows easy embedding of domain specific languages (DSLs). For
this, we picked and embraced Groovy, a dynamic programming language run-
ning on the JVM, which is (almost) a superset of Java. There are two APIs, a
high-level and a low-level one. Both are documented in the handbook available
under https://www3.hhu.de/stups/handbook/prob2/prob_developer.html.
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Fig. 1: Overview of the ProB Ecosystem
A general overview of ProB 2.0 is given in Fig. 1. For each B model that is
interacted with, an instance of the ProB-CLI (command line interface), which
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actually loads the model, is started in socket-mode. This means that the ProB-
CLI listens on a socket for commands to execute (whitelisted) Prolog code.
The whitelist offers fine-grained access to ProB’s constraint solving, animation
and model checking capabilities as well as ProB’s preferences and machine
components.
The high-level API abstracts away from ProB’s internals in Prolog. Two
objects in ProB 2.0 play a central role for animation: the state space and the
history. Each state discovered during model checking is part of a state space,
which is a representation of the underlying labelled transition system. Exploring
the state space by executing operations adds transitions and newly encountered
states. The history behaves like a browser history: It is append-only, but it is
possible to “go back in time” and start a new fork. Executing an operation
during animation automatically appends the successor state to the history.
In order for states to be meaningful, they require a representation in ProB
2.0. By default, ProB provides a string representation to ProB 2.0. Yet, they
can be translated into Java data structures: For example, B integers are trans-
lated into BigIntegers, B sets correspond to Java sets and sequences to Java lists.
Naturally, this translation does not work for infinite sets.
3 Examples
In this section, we describe different use cases based on several examples. The
first couple of examples we want to discuss are student projects implementing
two well-known games: Pac-Man and Chess. Furthermore, the approach found
use in two more complex projects, namely a safety critical, industrial application
for the ETCS Hybrid Level 3 concept, and a timetable planner for university
courses. In all four examples we translate the current state of the model into
Java data structures in order to provide an (interactive) visualisation.
3.1 Real-Time Animation: Pac-Man
Our first example application is based on a formal model of Pac-Man. Our version
of the game has two modes: firstly, the user can control the Pac-Man by pressing
the arrow keys. Then, the model is automatically driven (read: animated) by a
loop and can be run in real-time. Note that the model is non-deterministic in
the sense that there are multiple available operations, one for each direction the
Pac-Man may move. The user can change the direction and (according to the
rules) the Pac-Man will keep moving into that direction until it hits a wall. In
the second gamemode, the game plays itself, i.e., the Pac-Man is moved by a
heuristic implemented in Groovy. In both cases, the movement of all ghosts is
controlled by Pac-Man rules implemented in Groovy code.
Performance can be an issue for real-time applications. In the case of Pac-
Man, on modern machines it usually runs fairly well as the calculation of the
next-state function is very fast.
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Fig. 2: Architecture of a Pac-Man Game Based on a Formal Model
3.2 Predicting the Future: Chess
In the chess example, we have two use cases. Firstly, we want two (human) players
to be able to play against each other. Secondly, a (simple) chess AI should be
available to play against. As with Pac-Man, we use the formal specification in
order to specify the rules of the game. The model offers all possible moves as
enabled actions, checkmate is encoded as an invariant violation. Then, we can
use the vanilla ProB animator to play chess (preferably with an additional
visualisation of the current state).
The more interesting part is the AI which is hard to specify but somewhat
easy to implement. Thus, we write the AI in Java using ProB 2.0: we imple-
mented a Minimax algorithm with alpha-beta pruning. The calculated tree has
the current state at its root, its children are the successor states (representing
all valid turns by the AI), their children are their corresponding successor states
(where each state represents a turn by the human player) and so forth. For ter-
mination, we limit the depth of the state space that should be explored. This
depth determines the AI’s strength. We use a simple evaluation function (that
only depends on a single state) in order to assign a weight to each state. Then,
we pick the turn suggested by Minimax.
This strategy is very similar to bounded model checking. Yet, we do not care
for invariant violations in particular (an invariant violation suggests that one
player wins the game which the AI accounts for). Instead, we continue execution
of the model using an action that guarantees the most favourable outcome.
This case study offers worse results than Pac-Man. Due to the state space
explosion caused by the sheer amount of possible moves, generating all successor
as deep as required by a strong chess engine is infeasible. An implementation
in, e.g., plain C or Java is orders of magnitudes faster. Only a small part of the
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Fig. 3: Architecture of Chess Based on a Formal Model
state space from a given board position can be generated in reasonable time,
which results in the AI being a rather weak opponent.
3.3 Real Time Animation: ETCS Hybrid Level 3 Concept
We also used ProB 2.0 in an industrial project, that became a case study for
ABZ 2018 later on [8], as well as its successor project. Unfortunately, we are not
allowed to disclose the B model and application itself.
VBF
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Points
Modified Signals
Points
Virtual Track
Sections
Fig. 4: Architecture of the HL3 Prototype
The main idea is that by using a Virtual Block Function (VBF), the capacity
of existing railroad networks can be increased as track sections can be subdivided
even without adding sensors or other hardware to the tracks. The main part of
the VBF was written as a B model.
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Real, existing components running in separate processes or even (virtual)
machines are able to feed information into the model (by tailing logfiles and
calling wrapper interface functions implemented in C) in order to drive the
formal model. The resulting tool was used in order to control real signals and
trains on a test track. A video of the demonstration can be found under https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=FjKnugbmrP4, where the GUI implemented via
ProB 2.0 is seen starting at 2:30.
In our naive approach, data structures grow rather large and repeated com-
munication of all variables and constants results in an unacceptable performance
degradation, since the calculated results should be able to reach the components
in a few to hundreds of milliseconds. With a few performance enhancements,
e.g. pre-filtering data structures for possible changes and removing constants
from the communicated data, the application performs well enough on a regular
notebook computer.
3.4 ProB as a Constraint Solver: Plu¨S
Plu¨S is an application for planning university timetables [11,12] and is available
under https://plues.github.io/. The goal is to show that, starting from the
current timetables, it is possible for students to finish their studies in legal stan-
dard time for all courses or combinations of major and minor subjects. If a course
or a combination is found to be infeasible, the smallest conflicting set of classes
and timeframes should be provided such that it can be fixed manually. Complete
re-generation of timetables is avoided due to informal agreements, e.g., lecturers
prefer given timeslots or are unavailable on certain days.
A database stores information about all courses, e.g., for which subject they
can be attributed, whether they are mandatory or if other courses are required.
From this database, a B model is compiled. This is included in another B machine
that allows checking feasibility of a subject, move lectures etc. from one time-slot
to another and to calculate the unsatisfiable core if applicable.
On top of this functionality, a UI in JavaFX is implemented. Using the trace
of the model, i.e., considering movement of sessions to different timeslots, timeta-
bles can be generated as PDF files. The interaction with ProB is absolutely
hidden from the user.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented ProB 2.0 which offers a Java API to the ProBmodel
checker. ProB 2.0 renders it possible to write applications that interact with a
formal model at runtime, offering declarative programming, rapid prototyping
and easy debugging.
The main concern for real-life applications, as already stated by [9], is perfor-
mance. Because computers grew a lot faster since the early 90s, it is an option
that is viable to explore. Yet, applications written in traditional imperative,
functional or even logical programming languages are by orders of magnitudes
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faster because they have to work at lower levels of abstraction. For many time-
critical applications, however, this is not the way to go yet. As long as mediocre
performance suffices or is not a concern at all (e.g., if data sets are rather small),
utilising formal models allows us to quickly write usable applications that also
can make use of the eco-system associated with formal methods, e.g., generating
and discharging proof obligations, or model checking.
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Models developed with formal method language are rigorous but there is a
problem that it is costly to develop them. If the formal model we want is a
variant of a model that is already developed, it is natural that we want to reuse
it. We developed a method for extracting information that is useful for reusing
already existing models from them.
One problem with reusing models is that we need to comprehend the char-
acteristic of refinements. This is because we can implement specifications in
arbitrary order to some extent and from the view of verification and another
reuse, it is important to modify models in a way that suits their characteristics
of refinements.
Another problem is that we need to confirm the consistency of specifications
between different abstraction levels. Comprehending restrictions like guards and
invariants becomes difficult according to the size of the model, especially when
we have little knowledge of the model.
The main reason for these problems is that predicates in formal models have
implicit and complex relationships between before and after refinements. Our
method focuses on extracting information about these relationships and infor-
mation that show us how we should deal with a formal model. The method
we propose here labels guards with their relationships between before and after
refinements. We also stick labels that present information that can be used as
clues for modifying models on each action.
There are two types of label in this method, label on guards and label on
actions, and we deal them in a different way since they contain a different type
of information. The former provides information on how the model was con-
structed through stepwise refinements and the latter represents how difficult
their actions are to be modified and give us hints for modifying them without
losing consistency.
To label each predicate, our method first uses SMT solver. The SMT solver
analyzes guards whether their restrictions become stricter than before refinement
and actions whether there are any other values that do not break the consistency
of the model. Then, each predicate is labeled according to the result of SMT
solver with the consideration of the structure of the model.
There are four labels for guards and actions each. For label on guards, there
are Limited , Divided , Replaced , and Unchanged . Limited shows that the re-
striction of guard becomes stricter through refinement. Divided shows that the
situation when its event can operate is divided into several different situations
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through refinement. Replaced shows that the situation when its event can op-
erate does not change through refinement but has some variables replaced with
other variables. Unchanged shows that the guard does not change through re-
finement. For label on actions, there are Suggested , Restricted , Adapted , and
Untouched . Suggested shows that there are other values that can be substituted
in the action without changing other predicates in its event. Restricted shows
that some changes within the event are needed to modify the action. Adapted
shows that the action cannot be modified unless invariants are changed.
We have conducted the experiment with subjects of Smart Grid model and
Bridge model. We examined whether the labels support understanding the char-
acteristic of stepwise modeling and modifying models without breaking the con-
sistency of models.
For the first question, whether the labels support understanding the char-
acteristic of stepwise modeling, we focused on labels labeled on guards most in
each model. Smart Grid model has Divided label most and can be considered
that events in the abstract model were comprehensive of various cases and di-
vided into specific cases through refinements. For Bridge model, however, has
Limited label most and can be considered that most events are already prepared
in abstract model and the model’s refinements are mainly focused on depicting
specifications in detail.
For the second question, whether the labels support modifying models with-
out breaking the consistency of models, we focused on the ratio of labels on
actions in each model. Smart Grid model has 6 actions that have Suggested la-
bel, which means that they can take other values for substitution. On the other
hand, the Bridge model has only 2 actions that have Suggested label. However,
there are 10 actions labeled with Restricted label and this shows that these
actions can be modified if other actions or guards are modified together.
From the experiment, we confirmed that the labels we proposed are able to
extract information of refinement characteristics and modifiable predicates that
are useful for modifying models.
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